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Introduction
The size of government consumption relative to
gross national product (GNP) has grown steadily
in Europe and North America over most of the
post-World War II period. In real terms, govern-
ment expenditure in the United States has grown
at nearly 4 percent annually over the last four
and a half decades. As a percentage of GNP. it
rose from approximately 13.7 percent in 1946 to
22.1 percent in 1989.
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Until recently, most of the increases in U.S. gov-
ernment spending have been financed through
higher taxation (see Meltzer and Richard [1981]).
What are the likely effects of such increases on
output?
2 How would they differ if deficit financ-
ing were used? Our analysis seeks answers to
these questions.
• 1 It should be noted that growth in the share of government expendi-
ture on goods and services in the post-World War II period is mostly due to
growth in state and local expenditures. Federal spending as a share of GNP
fell in the 1970s, from 10 percent to 8 percent, and remained around 8 per-.
cent in the 1980s. Our analysis deals with total federal, state, and local gov-
ernment expenditures on purchases of goods and services.
Although most increases in government expen-
diture over the past 45 years have been perma-
nent, there have been a few notable exceptions
when government consumption rose temporarily
and then came back down to its trend level. These
periods have typically been war years, with the
World War II and Korean War eras being the most
obvious examples. The effects on output of financ-
ing such temporary increases depend on whether
deficit financing is used, and these effects can be
quite different from those arising as a result of a
permanent expansion in government spending.
It should be mentioned that increased levels of
government spending can affect output directly by
altering the conditions of production through the
provision of infrastructural inputs. We do not
analyze the effects of larger government expendi-
ture on output due to improved productivity of
inputs.-^ We also do not aim to provide an explana-
tion for die growth in government expenditure, or
to determine the optimal size of government.
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• 3 Aschauer (1989) estimates that the public investment component
of government expenditure has a positive and significant effect on the
level of output.
I 2 We abstract from the question of whether permanent increases in
government expenditure per se are good for the economy.
• 4 Meltzer and Richard (1981) develop a theory of the size of
government.Neither do we try to explain any particular epi-
sode in the United States.
Instead, our analysis is limited to tracing the
causal links among higher government expendi-
ture, tax policy, and the level of output. The
reason is that increases in government spending
—and the timing of taxation enacted to finance
them—affect private incentives to work and
save over time. Consequently, such increases
affect the level of output, interest rates, and
other economic variables. We also present some
illustrative simulations of the effects of perma-
nent and temporary increases in expenditure
with and without deficit financing in a stylized
model of the economy.
To conduct the analysis, we use the overlapping
generations model developed by Auerbach and
Kotlikoff(A-K) (1987). which is calibrated with
parameter estimates from various studies based on
U.S. data.
5 We present a brief description of this
model in section I. Section II discusses the effects of
permanent increases in government expenditure.
Our simulations show that with no deficit financing,
a permanent rise in government consumption leads
to lower long-run output. For an increase in expen-
diture of the magnitude of 4 percent per year, out-
put declines by about 2 percent. With deficit financ-
ing, output Is higher in the short run, but declines
considerably in the long run. Section HI deals with
the case of temporary increases. There are no long-
run effects on output if balanced-budget financing
is used. However, short-run effects on output are
sensitive to financing considerations. Section IV
concludes the paper.
I. The A-K Model
Most studies that have investigated the effects of
permanent and temporary changes in govern-
ment expenditure have used an infinite-horizon
representative-agent framework. All agents are
assumed to be identical and to live forever.
These models typically assume that government
revenues are raised by lump-sum taxes that are
nondistortionary.
6 These two assumptions imply
that the Ricardian equivalence theorem (RET) will
Ix? true. This theorem states that the timing of
taxes will not matter for private consumption and
leisure decisions, because if government expendi-
tures are financed through a deficit rather than by
• 5 See Wynne (1990) for an example of a representative-agent model
used to explain output and interest-rate changes in the United States arising
from increased government expenditure during World War II.
• 6 See. for example, Baxter and King (1990) and Aiyagari, Chris-
tiano. and Eichenbaum (1990).
current taxes, the infinitely lived agents will
anticipate the future tax liabilities implied by the
requirement that the government's intertem-
poral budget must be balanced. Both output and
interest rates will be the same under either of
these two financing arrangements.
Under the representative-agent framework,
both permanent and temporary increases in gov-
ernment expenditure boost output. A permanent
rise in government spending increases output be-
cause higher (lump-sum) taxes have a negative
income effect that leads individuals to reduce
leisure and thus to work harder. Temporary in-
creases also lead to higher interest rates and out-
put. If taxes are raised concurrently with greater
government expenditure, they will be higher
today than in the future. Individuals' attempts to
smooth consumption over time will induce them
to save less (or borrow more), causing interest
rates to rise. The higher interest rates will induce
greater work effort today because of the inter-
temporal substitution effect.
In this paper, we adopt the A-K overlapping
generations model, where individuals in each gen-
eration are concerned about their own welfare but
not about that of their offspring. This implies that
RET will not hold, because if taxes are increased
in the future, rather than contemporaneously,
some generations will escape the burden of higher
taxation. Thus, deficit-financed increases in gov-
ernment expenditure will have different effects
compared to those arising from balanced-budget
increases. Empirical studies have not yet resolved
the debate about the validity of RET.
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We also assume that government revenue is
generated by income taxation rather than
through lump-sum taxation. Unlike lump-sum
taxes, income taxes distort the labor-leisure
choice by driving a wedge between before- and
after-tax wage rates. Income taxes also distort
the consumption-saving decision by introduc-
ing a gap between before- and after-tax interest
rates. Using income taxation rather than lump-
sum taxation is largely responsible for the dif-
ference in our results compared to those
derived from representative-agent models.
The A-K model incorporates perfect foresight
on the part of individuals except with regard to the
policy change, which is assumed to be unantici-
pated. The alternative would be to use a model
with "myopia," where individuals behave as if
economic conditioas did not change from period
to period. Under the latter assumption, however,
it would be difficult to separate the effects of
• 7 A critical evaluation of the theory and evidence on RET is con-
tained in Bernheim (1987).irrational household behavior from those of the
policy change itself. Although perfect foresight
is an extreme assumption, it provides a useful
benchmark for analysis.
In the A-K model, each cohort is identical,
except for size differences due to population
growth. Each generation is 1 + n times larger
than its predecessor, and each has an economic
life span of 55 years. The annual utility function
is assumed to take a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution form given by
(1)
Here, the parameter p is the within-period elas-
ticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure, and is the intensity of preference for
leisure relative to consumption. Government
consumption in period t is represented by G,,
which is exogenous and enters separably in the
utility function. This implies that the size of
government consumption does not affect the
marginal utilities of private consumption and
leisure. Some evidence suggests that this assump-
tion may not be completely justified.** If we as-
sume that government expenditures are perfect
substitutes for private consumption and that
taxes are lump-sum, then increases in govern-
ment expenditure, whether permanent or tem-
porary, will have no effect on either output or
interest rates. Thus, the assumption that govern-
ment expenditure enters separably in the utility
function will overstate the effect on output.
Individuals choose consumption and leisure




where / indicates cohort age. The parameter y
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and
8 is the pure rate of time preference.
Households maximize utility (equation [2])
subject to a period-by-period budget constraint.
The time s budget constraint for individuals
aged t is given by
(3) «*,-«,.,. ,.,11 + ^(1-^)]
• 8 Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) estimate that an extra unit
of government consumption, all else equal, reduces private consumption
by between 0.2 and 0.4 units.
Here, rs refers to the before-tax rate of interest, Ts
refers to the income tax rate applied in period s,
and as, refers to the nonhuman wealth held in
period 5 by an individual aged /. The pre-tax
wage rate at time 5 is given by ws, and the vari-
able e, is an exogenous productivity parameter
for an individual in the t
lh period of life.
Output in the model is produced by competi-
tive firms that combine capital (K) and labor
(Z) using a constant-returns-to-scale production
technology. The production function is given by
(4)
Ys stands for output in period 5, and 8 is capital's
share in production. Note that this functional form
implies that government purchases of goods and
services do not enter as inputs into the production
function. This amounts to ignoring government
investment in public services and infrastructure,
which could have positive effects on the produc-
tivity of private capital and labor, as well as on the
level of total output. Aggregate capital and labor
supplies are determined from individuals' asset







Equations (5) and (6) represent the capital and
labor-market-clearing conditions, where Ist
stands for the leisure of an individual aged /
at time 5.
Under the assumption of competitive markets,
the pre-tax real wage and interest rates are given
by
and
(a) r = vin.r/Lr)






Equations (8) and (9) assume that the deprecia-
tion rate on physical capital is zero.
To solve the model, one must choose values for
the model's parameters. Auerbach and Kotlikoff
parameterize the model based on findings of vari-
ous empirical studies. Although we have retained
their choice of parameters in the simulations pre-
sented here, we do not examine the sensitivity of
the results to parametric variation. However, tests
of parametric sensitivity in the A-K study indicate
that the results are likely to be fairly robust. In any
event, the primary purpose of this paper is to ex-
amine the qualitative nature of the effects of the
policy changes considered.
The parameter p in equation (1), which deter-
mines how an individual's annual labor supply
responds to a change in the wage rate, is set to
O.8.
9 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
Y, is set to 0.25 based on various estimates.
1
0
The pure rate of time preference, 5, is set to
0.015. This implies an annual real interest rate of
6.9 percent per year, which is slightly less than the
estimated marginal productivity of capital.
1
1 The
leisure preference parameter, ex, is set to 1.5; it is
chosen so that individuals in the middle of their
working lives work approximately 40 percent of
their nonsleeping hours. The parameter estimates
lie within the ranges estimated in various empiri-
cal studies using U.S. data.
The parameter 0 in the production function,
which determines the share of capital in produc-
tion, is set to 0.25, approximating the historical
share of capital. The constancy of this measure
over time suggests the use of a Cobb-Douglas
production function. The effects on output due
to increased government expenditure will be
sensitive to the age-specific productivity profile
that is assumed. Rather than assume a flat age-
productivity profile, we assume an inverted U-
shaped profile. That is, productivity rises and
reaches a maximum at about the twenty-fifth year
of an individual's working life, and declines there-
after. The variable et represents the productivity
• 9 Ghez and Becker (1975), for example, estimate the value of p to
be 0.83.
• 10 See, for example, Grossman and Shiller (1981), who estimate y
to lie between 0.07 and 0.35.
• 11 We estimate that the average rate of return on capital was about
9 percent per year over the past decade.
of an individual aged / and is based on estimates
obtained by Welch (1979). The equation used in
the following simulations is
(11) e,= 4.47 + 0.033/- 0.00067/
2.
The solution to the model is obtained by find-
ing the wage and interest rates, so that labor
and capital markets clear in every period, s.
First, we solve the model for the initial steady
state, that is, before any policy changes are intro-
duced. It is assumed that in this steady state, the
government consumes 15 percent of output and
levies a 15 percent proportional income tax to
finance it. We selected this rate for our experi-
ments to mimic the level of government expendi-
ture that has prevailed over the post-World War II
period. This implies that the government's budget
is initially balanced. After a policy change is under-
taken, we solve the model for 150 years into the
future. This is sufficient to ensure that the model's
economy converges to the final steady state after








In the first simulation, government expenditure is
increased permanently by 5 percent of initial
steady-state output. Because government con-
sumption was 15 percent of output in the initial
steady state, this represents a 33 percent rise,
which is financed by a balanced-budget increase
in income taxes. Thus, the government's budget is
balanced both before and after the upturn in gov-
ernment expenditure.
In the short run, higher income tax rates reduce
after-tax wage and interest incomes. These reduc-
tions have an income effect on individuals' con-
sumption and labor supply. The decline in after-
tax income leads to lower consumption and
longer hours worked. However, there are also
substitution effects. A lower after-tax wage rate
implies that leisure is cheaper and induces individ-
uals to work fewer hours. The reduction in the
after-tax interest rate has an intertemporal substitu-
tion effect leading to reduced saving and lower
labor supply. Because people work in order to
consume both today and tomorrow, the lower,
after-tax interest rate reduces the incentive to workfor greater future consumption. The results
show that substitution effects dominate income
effects in the short run (see figure 1). Labor falls
by 0.5 percent, and saving declines to 1.8 per-
cent, from 3-7 percent of output in the first
period. The reduction in hours worked leads to
a decline in output of 0.4 percent.
The lower saving rate causes the capital stock
to fall in the subsequent period. A lower capital
stock increases the marginal productivity of cap-
ital, and hence the before-tax interest rate. This
helps to mitigate the intertemporal substitution
effects, causing the saving rate and hours worked
to expand gradually from their new lower levels.
As the charts in figure 1 show, the saving rate in
the long-run steady state is somewhat lower than
in the initial one.
After year six. individuals work longer hours
than they did before government expenditure
began to rise. The reduction in substitution effects
causes income effects to dominate eventually; in
the long run. labor supply is higher by 1.1 percent.
Output, however, is lower due to the decrease in
the capital stock. The charts show that the conver-
gence to the new steady state is gradual. The new
steady-state capital stock is reduced by 7.7 percent,
and output by 1.2 percent. Private coasumption is
7.3 percent lower than it was before government
spending rose.
Increases in government expenditure cause
output to decline because an income tax is distor-
tionary. That is. the higher taxes distort the labor-
leisure and .savings decisions of individuals. Baxter
and King (1990) show that in a representative-
agent model with lump-sum (nondistortionary)
taxes, permanent increases in government expen-
diture actually cause output to be higher. No
within-period substitution effect is associated with
lump-sum taxes. Higher lump-sum taxes, how-
ever, reduce lifetime resources, and individuals
optimally choose lower levels of consumption and
leisure, so that employment and output are higher.
It should be emphasized that increased output
does not imply that people are better off. This
depends on how much individuals on the margin




The next simulation shows the effects of an
identical increase in government expenditure
that is deficit financed. Deficit financing is used
for the first 10 years, after which taxes are
increased by enough to cover both greater
spending and the interest on the government's
debt. This time profile of taxation results in inter-
temporal substitution effects. Lower taxes today-
compared to tomorrow induce individuals fac-
ing higher future taxes to work more today and
less tomorrow. Figure 2 shows that labor supply
rises by 2.7 percent in the first period. It also
causes the younger generations to consume less
today in order to save for consumption tomor-
row. Aggregate private consumption falls by 2
percent initially, but this is not enough to offset
the increase in government consumption. Thus,
the economy's saving rate falls from 3.7 percent
to 2.3 percent. Furthermore, given the initial
stock of capital, the higher labor supply in the
short run causes a small rise in the interest rate,
from 6.7 percent to 6.8 percent. Higher labor
supply also causes output to jump by 2 percent
in the first year after the policy change.
A further effect arises from the intergeneration-
al redistribution of resources caused by deficit
financing. Since taxes do not increase at all for the
first 10 years, some initial older generations escape
the burden of higher future taxes. Their lifetime
resources expand because of the higher interest
rates during this period. This induces greater con-
sumption on the part of the older generations,
which helps to explain why the decline in total
private consumption is insufficient to offset the
increase in government consumption.
When taxes increase after year 10, the inter-
temporal substitution effects are reversed.
Labor supply contracts sharply. This, along with
the continual decline in the capital stock, causes
output to fall. The interest rate drops.dramat-
ically, reflecting the increase in the capital-
labor ratio in period 11. It continues to rise
thereafter, however, reflecting the increasing
marginal productivity of capital, as the capital
stock continues to shrink while hours worked
expand. In the new long-run steady state, the
capital stock is lower by 25.2 percent, and out-
put is reduced by 7.3 percent. This crowding-
out effect is much larger than the effect of the
balanced-budget increase in government expen-
diture considered earlier. It reflects the greater
distortionary effect of the higher tax rates under
deficit financing that are imposed on young and
future generations to pay for the redistribution
toward the initial older generations.FIGURE 1
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The next set of simulations examines the effects
of a five-year increase in government expendi-
ture financed by a contemporaneous increase in
taxes. One can think of these experiments as
being caused by a five-year war, during which
taxes are raised to pay for military operations. In
the long run, years after the war ends, all vari-
ables return to the values they held prior to the
expansion of government spending. The reason
is that tax rates and the share of government ex-
penditure in output are both identical to their
pre-war levels.
The charts in figure 3 show the effects of
these policies on capital, labor, and output.
Taxes are higher during the war years. Substitu-
tion effects dominate income effects, since a
five-year tax increase does not reduce lifetime
income by much. Because of the intertemporal
substitution effect, people choose to work less
during the war years when taxes are high, and
to work more in later periods when taxes are
lower. Labor supply is also reduced due to the
within-period substitution effect that operates
on the labor-leisure choice.
Labor supply falls by 2.6 percent, causing out-
put to decline 2.0 percent in the first period of the
five-year war. Because capital is fixed at the initial
steady-state level in the first year, the large nega-
tive effect on output in the first period is solely
due to the substitution effects on labor supply.
If government expenditure were high for only
one year (instead of five), labor supply would fall
by 4.0 percent (versus 2.6 percent for the five-year
war). The larger decline in labor supply is due to
the stronger intertemporal substitution effect in
the case of a one-year war. There are two rea-
sons for this. First, unlike the five-year case,
lower labor supply during periods of high taxa-
tion cannot be spread over time in the one-year
case. Second, a greater number of generations
will face lower future taxes in a one-year war
than in a five-year war. Hence, the first-period
effects on labor supply and thus on output are
larger in the one-year war.
Given the desire of individuals to smooth
their consumption over time in the face of tem-
porarily higher taxes, saving initially falls from
3.7 percent of output to -0.8 percent of output.
Thus, although the income-tax rate rises from
15 percent to 20.4 percent in the first year, con-
sumption falls by only 3.0 percent. The dra-
matic decline in saving shows up in period two,
as capital falls by nearly 1.2 percent. Labor sup-
ply, consumption, output, and saving continue
to be depressed during the second through the
fifth years of the war, when taxes are still high.
Thus, the capital stock continues to decline until
year six. After the war is over and government
expenditure returns to its original level, all vari-
ables gradually return to their pre-war levels.
Deficit-Financed
Increases
Most temporary increases in government spend-
ing are the result of wars, and most wars are defi-
cit financed. That is, taxes are not raised during
the war, but only at some time after the war has
ended. The final simulation shows the effects of a
five-year war when taxes are not increased until
the year after the war concludes. Thus, taxes are
slightly higher from year six on, rising by just
enough to cover the additional interest expense
on the war debt.
The charts in figure 4 show the effects that a
five-year deficit-financed war can be expected to
have on the economy. The tax profile facing pri-.
vate individuals has income and substitution
effects, and again, income effects are small and
substitution effects dominate. During the war
years, taxes are lower than their level in later peri-
ods. Hence, individuals choose to work longer
hours during the war years and to curtail labor
supply in later periods. During the first year of the
war, labor supply increases by 1.2 percent. Since
capital is fixed during the first period, the higher
labor supply causes output to rise by 0.9 percent
and leads to a slight increase in the interest rate.
Private consumption drops by 0.9 percent as
individuals save more for future consumption.
This decrease, however, is insufficient to off-
set the increase in government consumption.
Although private saving rises, aggregate saving is
depressed because of the larger decline in govern-
ment saving (that is, the government saves noth-
ing in the initial steady state and is a net borrower
during the war years). This leads to a decline in
the capital stock over subsequent years. A lower
capital stock, coupled with lower hours worked
because of higher taxes, causes output to fall even
further. In the long-run steady state, the capital
stock is 7.6 percent lower, labor supply is 0.6 per-
cent lower, and output is 2.4 percent lower com-
pared with the initial steady state.FIGURE 3
The Effects of Temporary Balanced-
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SOURCE: Authors calculations.IV. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effects of both
permanent and temporary changes in govern-
ment expenditure on labor supply, interest rates,
output, and the capital stock. Both the short- and
long-run effects depend critically on whether the
higher expenditures are financed with higher
taxes initially or with government budget deficits.
A simulation in which government expendi-
tures increased permanently from 13.7 to 22.1
percent of GNP (as they did over the last four
decades) led to a long-run decline in output of
2.1 percent. This number is a benchmark esti-
mate of the effect on output because of perma-
nently higher government consumption. With
deficit financing, output is higher in the short
run because of the increase in labor supply in-
duced by the intertemporal substitution effects
of lower taxes earlier and higher taxes later.
However, the long-run steady-state level of out-
put is lower with deficit financing than without
it. This occurs because of the higher tax rates
necessary under deficit financing to service the
accumulated debt.
Temporary increases in government expendi-
ture, if financed by contemporaneous tax hikes,
result in temporary declines in output because
of the within-period substitution effect of the
currently high taxes on the labor-leisure margin
of choice. This effect is magnified by the inter-
temporal substitution effect. Individuals sub-
stitute current for future leisure because of the
temporary increase in taxes. When a balanced
budget is maintained during a temporary in-
crease in government spending, all variables
return to their initial steady-state levels in the
long run. Under deficit financing, however,
long-run output is slightly lower because of the
adverse effects on labor supply caused by the
higher taxes necessary to service the debt accu-
mulated during the war years.
Unlike the case in the representative-agent
model, output increases only in the presence of
deficit-financed government expenditure. This
is true for both permanent and temporary in-
creases in government spending. When revenue
is raised in a balanced-budget fashion, output
declines. This is a result of the distortionary na-
ture of taxation that induces intratemporal sub-
stitution in favor of working more hours, as well
as intertemporal substitution in favor of work-
ing when taxes are low.
A further reason for the difference in results
between this model and the representative-
agent model is the intergenerational redistribu-
tion aspect of deficit financing. Some older
generations escape higher future tax burdens
and as a result consume more than they other-
wise would. This leads to higher interest rates
that again induce greater work effort on the part
of the labor force.References
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